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The Political Economy of Iraq's Growing Oil Power: A Crucial Phase
Sabri Zire Al-Saadi, 4/1/2010 
Introduction
The very difficult circumstances of the last seven years in Iraq – which caused a tremendous human
suffering, and inflicted huge material and financial loss to the Iraqis, as well as to the United States and
its main ally Britain – have shown the strength of the Iraqis in bearing the burden of these damaging
events, their high spirit for defending their liberties, and their determination to establish a new politically
liberal and democratic state. Also, the experience of the Gulf and Middle East region – rich in oil and
gas and characterized by inter-states conflicts, especially with the recent rise of Iran's ambitions as a
nuclear power – confirm Iraq's strategic importance and the need for its stability.
However, its success in establishing a liberal and democratic political system depends to a large extent
on Iraq's capacity for building the national economy where the private and public sectors play
complementary roles in a more liberalized market for utilizing its abundant human and natural resources
– especially oil and gas – for improving living standards in terms of income, consumption, public health
and education services, and provision of public utilities. Also, policies and measures for market
liberalization should consider the strategic importance of developing non-oil industrial sectors and
diversifying national income sources.
A side issue, nonetheless relevant, is the examination of the suggested economic remedy in this article
may prove useful in debating whether the objectives of the U.S. military presence in the Middle East are
to maintain stability of the region, the management of the regional power balance, or as an instrument to
help in the establishment of democracy and civil societies.[1]
Last year, Iraq achieved significant success in combating terrorism and limiting violence and sectarian
conflict, as well as fairly improving the national reconciliation process. However, economic failure
continues to prevail despite high public expenditures and the availability of financial resources. The vast
majority of people are still living in hardship conditions or remain poor.
Significantly, in recent months, the government has signed new investment agreements with the oil
foreign companies that aim at increasing the crude oil production from its existing rich oil fields as of
2016/2017.[2] The successful implementation of these agreements will have strategic economic and
political importance far exceeding their financial outcome, just as Iraq’s history has shown in 1951 when
oil revenues substantially increased as a result of the 50/50 profit sharing agreement signed with foreign
oil companies, and the subsequent increase in world oil prices in 1973.[3] The impact of increasing oil
production to 12 million barrels per day (b/d) and a parallel increase in exports would greatly influence
the world oil and energy markets.
The aim of this article is to analyze reasonably – albeit a personal vision – the expected impact of the
“targeted success” of these agreements on the economy and the likely change in the positions of the
country driving forces in the coming years. It highlights that if the government continues not to have
economic direction as the last seven years experienced, the “targeted” financial benefits from the new oil
agreements would restrict the required far-reaching economic, social, and political development of the
country.
Based on earlier conclusions, the implication of having additional oil power has two main contradictory
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possibilities:[4]
a. Rational utilization of the "excessive" oil revenues in building the national economy and
alleviating the related social problems. This objective can only be realized by applying the
economic diversification strategy that reduce the State (governments) high dependence, and
consequently the people reliance, on oil exports for financing public and private expenditures
and imports.
b. Or the other possibility; exploiting the oil revenues for serving the interests of small economic
and social groups and the ruling political elite that lead to limiting the democratic process, and
might encourage the rise of a new dictatorial regime. The structural economic crisis will then be
perpetuated while the society enjoys a substantial increase of the public and private
consumption.
Also, if not rationally utilized, additional huge oil power might invite the future government to engage in
the power-game, or even worse to be involved in the ideological and political conflicts among the
region’s countries.[5]
Features of the Political Economy
Since the establishment of modern Iraq in the early 1920’s until  the end of 1960’s, the country has been
a pioneer among the Middle East in enjoying a variety of liberties of the then semi-liberal regimes. Also,
the experience showed that the accumulated misuse of oil revenues since the 1950’s has been a major
factor behind its present problems.[6] This explains why the Iraqis have always been keen in expressing
their interest and awareness of the oil wealth prosperity and adversities, especially there has been no
record of fairly economic progress made by the governments for a long time.
Since 2003, the experience showed that the ruling parties and the governments have no national future
vision and economic and social development programs supported by clear political commitments for
dealing with the prevailing amounting problems.[7] And when the prominent politicians publicly confess
that the government’s shortcoming extends beyond maintaining a stable political system to include the
failure in alleviating the socio-economic problems, then the conclusion that there exist serious political,
economic, and social crises becomes a nation-wide priority issue.[8]
The experience revealed that the governments and the main parties have vague understanding of the
required economic policies and institutions. More important, among the ruling parties, there is no
coherent vision or concrete views that outline the essential features of Iraq’s modern State; i.e. Iraq's
long-term objectives and the political, economic, and social strategies, which make the task of
implementing integrated economic policies extremely difficult.
In reality, insufficient recognition of Iraq’s real economic problems has been reflected by the current
flawed policy that mix up between the need for liberalizing the market from the State’s intervention and
the necessity to appreciate two important facts:
1. The collective interests such as the public education and health services cannot be realized
by the individual and self-interests.
2. The public ownership of oil wealth (revenues).
At present, the following political economy features are observed:
1. The people are widely involved in public politics as have been reflected by their interest in the
general and the governorates’ elections, while there is a downwards trend in the popularity of the
Shiite and Sunni parties. Also, the liberal and democratic parties, including the ruling parties in
Kurdistan Federal Region (KFR), are losing their popularity and effectiveness.[9]
2. The failure of the dominant parties in protecting the individual and public liberties, maintain
political stability, and promoting democracy. This is also observed in KFR which has enjoyed a
stable and secured situation after the occupation in April  2003.[10]
3. The early failure of the liberal national conference party, the royal constituency movement,
and to a less degree al-wifaq movement reflect how Iraqis react in a sensitive way to the socially
and politically privileged personalities who did not share their hardship in the past.
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4. The apparent governments’ failure in providing the people’s basic needs, essential public
services, reconstruction the infrastructure, and reviving the economy.
5. The increasing disparity in income and wealth between the few wealthy war and occupation
beneficiaries and the prominent politicians and their privileged close supporters on one side, and
the people’s majority whom living standards have been deteriorating, unemployment among
active population is increasing, and more are falling into the poverty trap. The disparity also
exists among the governorates.[11]
6. Lack of public services, bad housing conditions, and increasing prices of the real estate, are
causing a growing social and political concern.
7. Widespread and serious financial and administrative corruption in all the government
institutions, especially among the ruling political elite.[12]
8. The influence of public sector enterprises is receding, the weakness of the middle class
continues, and the private sector remain small, while a wealthy small groups of traders and
contractors, as well as the emergence of wealthy professional politicians are dominating the
public scene.[13]
9. While unemployment rate is high, the number of employee in the government departments
and public entities, including the army and the security forces, has substantially increased.[14]
The problem of over-employment is particularly acute in KFR[15].
10. Neither the present government nor the main political parties have wide and effective
relationships with the citizens that would help them to understand the people real problems.[16]
Iraq's National Future Vision - Unfolded
In addition to its strategic geopolitical advantages, the successful implementation of the new oil
agreements would improve Iraq's opportunity to be one of the most developed countries in the Middle
East, as well as being an influential, if not playing the swinging role, in affecting the policies of the
“Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries” (OPEC). Adding (6-9) million b/d to the world’s crude
oil supply would drastically affect the trends and prices in the crude oil and energy markets, as well as
causing a far-reaching shift in the power balance in the Middle East region.
Since the 1950's, the Iraqi regimes; the semi-liberal, the Arab nationalist, the Arab socialist, the
dictatorial, and the present mixed inhomogeneous regime led by the Islamic governments dominated by
the Shiite and the Sunni, have experienced, in different degrees, the adversities of high dependence on
oil revenues.[17] At present, however, Iraq faces the challenge of fundamental inquest; how can the
national economy be built as part of the liberal, democratic, and socially progressive State that would be
pioneer in the Middle East?
The experience showed that any attempt for designing the required economic strategy and policies
cannot be effective enough without a framework of national future vision in which the oil wealth
considered as a strategic factor.[18] In fact, oil  revenues continue to play a key role in keeping Iraq's
State intact after the fall of the former dictatorial regime by financing the military and security forces,
increasing public expenditures, providing public services, and even financing, directly or indirectly, the
political parties and groups. Indeed, the State viability has been largely maintained during the last seven
years by the revenues of producing and exporting the crude oil at the average of 1.650, 2.000, 1.750,
1.930, 2.000, 2.340, and 2.400 million b/d in the years 2003 to 2009.[19] This is why the citizens and
the political parties have raised their concern and demand for increasing investments in the
rehabilitation of the depleted infrastructure of the oil industry by the government. Indeed, demand for
increasing oil revenues has always been a matter of necessity. Since early 1980's, the call for
increasing oil production and exports escalated as a result of the devastating and costly Iraq-Iran war.
The catastrophic consequences of the UN economic and trade sanctions (August 1990-April 2003)
which was imposed on Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait revealed how important it is for Iraq to maintain
high level of oil production and exports.[20]
After occupation, the domestic and foreign interests in oil policies have been widely varied; the
rehabilitation of the infrastructure of the oil industry and maximization of oil production and exports were
popular, the foreign concerns advised the privatization of the oil industry, some advocate the "fantasy" of
distributing oil revenues in cash among the citizens, others suggest that rehabilitation of the industry
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should be done by the public enterprises, and some preferred service contracts rather than direct
investment agreements with the oil foreign companies. Nevertheless, within the prevailing political
economy framework, maintaining the public ownership of the all activities of the industry; i.e. exploration,
extraction, exports, and industrialization have been the major concern of the people.
Significantly, however, all these views and related policy suggestions, have not tackled the problematic
relationship between the way of utilizing the oil revenues and the objectives of economic strategy and
the macroeconomic policies. In fact, the interests of all concerned parties were centered on the financial
outcome.
At present, since the government has signed the new oil agreements with the foreign companies
regardless of its cost-benefit assessment, it is essential to analyze its likely future implication in view of
the country’s long-term strategies that should be guided by national future vision. The agreements have
confirmed the prevailing dominant perception since 1970's that Iraq has the potential of producing up to
10 million b/d of crude oil and hence have the capacity to maintain a strategic position in the Middle
East. Let us remember that Saddam Hussein and the Baath party have such ambitions in order to build
a strong State of Iraq. They had a future vision for Iraq, but, unfortunately, it was wrong vision.
Growing Oil Power
Iraqi views have been different in assessing the financial and economic cost-benefit and legality of
these agreements; while some views were preferable,[21] others question its legality[22] or highlight the
negative implication of having foreign companies controlling the oil wealth, and there is a question
whether the “targeted” increase of public financial resources has urgent economic need. Such
differences are similar to those views hindering the approval of the proposed “oil and gas law 2007”
which was authorized by the government but rejected by the parliament,[23] as well as the views that
deny the tendency of the government of KFR to dispute the centralization of public oil purse and
allocation.
According to these agreements, crude oil production will be increased to an average of 12 million b/d as
from 2016.[24] I.e. the new investment will add 9 million b/d to the present production of 2.4 million b/d.
Such new reality would radically change the future trends in the energy markets by adding about 38% to
the OPEC oil supply in 2016 and 18% in 2030.[25] As for the world oil demand, the expected exports'
increase of about 9 million b/d, shall constitute about 9.4% and 8.5% of the estimated world's demand in
2016 and 2030 respectively.[26] But most important, it puts Iraq at a new historical economic and
political transfer stage ample with contradicting possibilities similar, if not more radical, to the 1970's
period. In particular, the direction and effectiveness of the economic policies of the coming governments
might be affected.
In spite of the skeptical views that reduce the high expectation of the “targeted” increase of oil
production due to the country’s limited export capacities,[27] or casting doubts on the economic viability
and the risk of producing more than 6 million b/d,[28] the psychological impact of the new oil
agreements starts to influence the domestic political economy, and also the region where some
observers refer to the likely change of the political and economic power balance among the Middle East
countries in favor of Iraq.[29]
Undoubtedly, the expected increase of crude oil production to 12 million b/d is a new strategic factor
that will reshape the future of Iraq’s State.
The immediate and likely longer-term effects of these agreements on the present economic and political
reality, and its adversity if the required radical changes are not carried out in due time, can be perceived
as follows:  
1. The principle of giving priority to the economic strategy and policies leading the oil policy has
already been violated. In fact, neither there is a well-defined economic strategy and policies, nor
the new oil agreements considered the prevailing economic conditions.[30] Such a situation
would sustain the government’s short-term economic approach and most probably relax the
efforts for dealing with the chronic structural economic problems.
2. It is expected that the governments and public enterprises expenditures would increase
substantially, especially for financing the physical, social, and environmental infrastructure
projects, and consequently accelerate the process of contracting hastily with the foreign
companies for their implementation. Such situation highlights that the existing problem of the
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State’s limited administrative absorptive capacities would be worsened.
3. The availability of “excessive” oil revenues would provide the coming governments with the
opportunity for concealing their failure in dealing with the existing socio-economic problems. This
expectation is based on the inefficient economic management of the country on one side, and
the political parties’ tendency for gaining popular support by promising the continuation of the
current wrong-medication, morally subdued, and financially costly the “food ration system”, as
well as the provision of the oil products at subsidized low prices on the other.[31]
4. As the oil economic and political power grows, the demand of the citizens and the liberal
reforms groups for the rationalization of the public spending would be increased; i.e. the issue of
likely “exorbitant” public spending of the “excessive” oil revenues would rule the political
economy activities.
5. Given the seven years lax governance of the country, the efforts for increasing the capacities
and efficiency of the government’s economic, financial and monetary departments and public
agencies, as well as the tasks of re-evaluation of the public enterprises would be relaxed even
more.
6. As a result of high public expectation of speedy economic recovery, the reliance on the
government expenditures would be increased, and the demand for economic liberalization would
be amounted.
7. On the foreign policy, the confidence in the State having a higher bargaining political,
financial, economic, and military power vis-à-vis the neighbour countries, shall increase
significantly.
Economic Growth and Investment Conditions
At present, it is unfortunate that there is a perception among most of the politicians, and the public too,
assumes that the abundant oil revenues are sufficient requirement for raising economic growth and
improving the living standards. Oil revenues, however, are necessary, but they are not sufficient for
increasing production, productivity, and employment, as well as indigenizing the modern industries and
advanced technologies. In reality, the existence of market distortions; namely, lack of physical
infrastructure, shortage of skill labor, immobile labor force and other factors of production, the price and
in-kind income subsidies, institutional barriers, and some social values and traditions, reduces
substantially the practical value of such trouble-free optimistic suggestion.
Given the existence of market failure conditions, the prevailing main economic facts and issues can be
generally identified as follows: 
1. Sluggish non-oil production, high unemployment, low level of individual income and
consumption, low level of investment and exports, especially non-oil products, and high
dependence on oil revenues for financing the government expenditures and imports. Non-oil
revenues of the government’s annual budget are insignificant. Against these realities, the World
Bank’s estimation of the macroeconomic indicators showed that GDP grew in real terms by 4.6%
during the period 2004-2009 and the growth rate is expected to be 5.8% in 2010 and 6.8% in
2014.[32] Regardless how realistic these office-desk simple arithmetic estimations are, they
failed to show how much the oil and non-oil sectors contribute to GDP in the past and the future.
2. Increasing disparities between the few "new wealthy” groups and the majority of people with
low income and living standards which create social discontent among them.
3. The structural economic problems constitute the main challenge facing the nation. The
challenge needs a strong political will, administrative skill, and persuasive public debate in order
to compromise the need for efficient utilization of oil revenues and the reduction of dependence
on crude oil exports by the expansion of production capacities in industry, agriculture, and
services to increase their contribution to GDP and exports. The economic criteria for assessing
the performance in meeting this challenge are; the expansion of the production capacities of the
non-oil economic sectors, especially industry and agriculture, that would increase their share to
GDP by at least 80 percent, increasing the share of non-oil exports to total exports to at least 70
percent, increasing the non-oil revenues of the government annual budgets to at least 50
percent of total public expenditures, and increasing the contribution of private sector to 70
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percent of GDP[33].
4. The total government expenditures, which were documented by the International and
Monitoring Board for Iraq (IAMB) and the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) amounted to
$178,276,134 million during the period (13th May 2003- 31 July 2009). And total public oil
revenues were amounted to $169,472,004 million during the same period. Oil revenues
constituted 90.58 percent of the total received cash during this period.[34] Also, Iraq total foreign
reserves reached $49.530 billion in 17th December 2009, including 2.692 billion gold assets and
SDR.[35] It is also expected that oil revenues will be increased in 2010 due to expected increase
of the crude oil exports volume and its prices. This would eventually lead to a parallel increase in
government expenditures as well as in the country's foreign currency reserves.
5. In pursuing its economic policies, the governments relied on the annual "three years rolling"
budget that has to be revised annually. The new system, which is a copy of the US budget
system and implemented since 2003, was based on the principle of reducing the State’s
economic role in favour of promoting the investment activities of the private sector in a free
market. It replaced the former two-tier system which was applied since the 1950’s; i.e. the annual
budget for financing the government and public expenditures, and the second, the economic and
social development plan and programmes which were prepared for financing the economic
(physical) and social public infrastructure projects. The implementations of those plans were
regulated by the execution of annual investment programs. As the actual experience showed,
the new system misidentified the relevancy of the country’s prevailing salient economic and
social features and the domestic market conditions.
6. Iraq's new experience has been characterized by the absence of clear governments' economic
policies and the limited role of the professional indigenous economists in the decision-making
processes. Coupled with the political centralization of the country’s governance and the dominant
economic and political role of the oil revenues, active economic problem-solving and strategic
thinking have been lacking.[36]
While it is always possible to shed doubt on the practical value of the given views and propositions in
this paper, Iraq's economic experience during the three decades before 1980 confirm that it is possible
to apply them by Iraqi institutions and professionals with their available expertise provided that there are
political commitments and strong will to undertake the required change and modernization.[37]
To increase economic growth and employment as well as improving the living standards, government
efforts should be intensified to increase public and private, indigenous and foreign, investment. Most of
oil revenues should be allocated to the domestic public investment. However, these efforts as
represented by the actual public investment expenditures and the issued of the “investment law” have
very limited impact. The “investment law”, even if modified to cope with the more liberalized investment
regulations applied in the region’s countries, would not be effective in increasing domestic investment
and indigenizing the foreign investment. The reason simply is that there exists insufficient infrastructure
for big investments.
Following the widely practiced investment promotion conferences in the oil-rentier economies in the Gulf
region, Iraq arranged many similar conferences with the collaboration of the U.S., the WB and the IMF,
in the last seven years to attract foreign investment in utilizing the available opportunities in industry,
agriculture, trade, housing, transport and communication, financial and personal services sectors.
However, the outcome was not successful. It is obvious that Iraq has many attractive investment
opportunities, but their utilization is still restricted not only by the unsettled government economic
policies, but also by the lack of the physical infrastructure and skill labor as well as the existing
institutional barriers. Unfortunately, those constraints cannot be removed in the short-term, especially for
the indigenizing foreign investment in industry.
For Iraq, it is necessary to distinguish between the foreign contractors companies that have advance
technology needed for building the required public physical infrastructure and the expansion of the
production of electricity and construction materials in the public sector enterprises, and the foreign
companies that have the potential in indigenizing modern industries, advance financial services,
advance agriculture production technology, and other productive economic activities. The first group of
foreign companies needs no particular incentives in order to work as long as the State has enough
financial resources to finance the public projects. The second group, which is more important for building
the national economy and sustaining economic growth, needs careful and longer-term economic,
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institutional, legal, and spatial preparations to attract them. Otherwise, foreign investment would be very
limited to financial investment and real estate or in the owning the public strategic industries when
privatized.
Lack of Institutional Economic Policies
In Iraq, effective economic policies cannot be achieved without prior knowledge of the State economic
strategy that requires at least two conditions: 
i. Understanding the dynamics of Iraq’s oil-rentier economy under imperfect market conditions.
ii. Political commitment to the objectives of the State's future vision.
If these conditions are not satisfied, the government claims of being capable in dealing with the
mounting economic problems are worthless. Unfortunately, this is the case where neither the
government's economic advisors nor the politicians have enough knowledge to define their economic
strategy and policies. The lack of the government oil policy has also prevailed.[38] Moreover, there is no
coherent national vision on the objectives of the targeted modern State of Iraq. In this respect, one
should mention that while such perception and knowledge are part of the government's responsibilities,
the citizens are only interested in their economic and welfare conditions. The private sector, though
always interested in knowing how the economy works, is not responsible for the economy’s efficiency or
dealing with its existing problems.
Evidently, there is no significant difference between the absence of the concept of economic policies
during 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s on one side, and the chaotic management of the national economy in
the last seven years on the other. In the early times, there have been general governments' statements
in which some financial measures and a limited number of public development projects were included
and presented in the annual budget and in separate public works programs covering a number of years.
In the last few years, however, many new laws have been approved and many government's
documents, statements, and promises have been issued, but they were either ineffective or incoherent
and impractical. In reality, there were many unrelated financial decisions and measures applied within
the framework of the annual budget with a rigid monetary policy.[39] In practice, the government
frequently made statements promoting the role of the private sector which proved to have no solid base
to materialize. In addition, there is no effective coordination between the economic, financial, and
monetary institutions.
Also, the fiscal policy that encourages non-productive expenditures on the pretext of economic
expansion and increasing employment in the government departments and public agencies, as well as
the rigid "independent" monetary policy that suppose to maintain economic stability; controlling inflation
and the fixed exchange rate of the Iraqi Dinar vis-à-vis $US, both of them are irrelevant. These policies
were wrong simply because the government expenditures constitute the major share of the aggregate
effective demand that generate the consumption and investment and their multipliers, and ultimately
stimulate economic growth.
As for the monetary policy, the effects of the interest rates and the bank credits are very limited, while
the exchange rates regime is basically determined by the availability of the foreign currency from the
crude oil exports which are enough to maintain the required imports. As a matter of fact, the rigidity of
the foreign exchange regime contribute to the hidden economic structural problem; i.e. sustaining the
economy dependence on oil revenues.[40] As for the increase of the foreign currency reserves, the
monetary policy has nothing to do with it. The practice showed that once the annual budget
expenditures are determined by the government ministries and agencies, the IDF that is still under the
international control, allocates the required money for it. Also, since the total budget allocations
exceeded the actual expenditures; i.e. the absorptive economic and institutional capacities are limited,
the surplus balance of oil revenues and actual expenditures were added to the foreign currency
reserves. Hence, against the actual practice, there is an urgent need for close coordination between the
fiscal policy and the monetary policy rather than the false claim that the independent monetary policy
helps to curb inflation and stabilize the exchange rates and accumulate the country's foreign currency
reserves. One aspect of the monetary policy dilemma was publicly exposed in the suggestion that Iraq
has to have a new “foreign currency budget” in which lower and upper limits of the foreign currency
reserves have to be annually determined and certain amounts of it should be allocated to the private
sector.[41]
In addition, the authorities followed the ill-advised economic reform policy of the IMF that encourage the
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unconditional and hasty economic liberalization and borrowing foreign loans – while the country has
huge reserves – instead of adopting the strategy for economic diversification and gradual market
liberalization coupled with the application of moderate social welfare program.
On the reconstruction of the public physical, social, and environmental infrastructure, the government
failure is apparent.
As for the oil policy, after settling the major issues of investment in the industry by the new oil
agreements, it shall continue to perform two main usual tasks: 
i. Maintain the oil exports at preferable prices. This function provides adequate estimates of the
annual oil revenues, but adds nothing to the economic policies.
ii. Increasing efforts for the industrialization of the crude oil; the petrochemicals, oil refining, and
oil products.
The Economic, Social, and Political Driving Forces
An attempt to assess the likely future change of positions of the driving economic, social, and political
forces by traditional social class analysis is not fully applicable. The Iraqi case is simpler. Out of the total
population, there are about 24 percent of poor people and the majority of the rest can be classified as
lower middle class in term of income, consumption, education, housing, and other criteria. Most of those
people have the purpose to link with the dominant political power hoping for improving their daily living
conditions. Also, the economic and financial interests of the private companies and business individuals
and communities as well as of political parties rely substantially on the government and public
expenditures. The State, on the other side, depends heavily on oil revenues in running its normal
functions. The people contribute nothing to the public finance; i.e. different forms of taxes, and,
therefore, the pressure on the governments from the tax-payers is nil. Hence, the ruling authority plays
the key role in influencing the country's economic and political activities, but not the social class or the
groups of traders, the contractors, the industrialists, the rich farmers, or the business men. In Iraq, the
major power is the oil wealth, which has been held and used by the ruling authority.
However, there is also the social power of the Shiite religious establishment, represented by the Grand
Ayatollah Ali Sistani that exerts its important influence on the dominant Shiite communities. Significantly,
the establishment is financially independent from government expenditures. Thus, it has the power to
shape the future political events.
It is not a new experience that the high increase or the sharp decrease of oil revenues had a huge
impact, mostly negative, on the social values and traditions of the oil-rentier countries. Similar change
has happened in other oil-rentier society earlier.[42] In Iraq’s case, when oil revenues suddenly and
sharply dropped, it led to the catastrophic deterioration in the living standards and changed some of the
good values and traditions of the society during the period (1990-2003).[43] During the last seven years,
the negative impacts of the wastefulness of public expenditures financed by the high increase of oil
revenues have magnified the corruption and accelerated the deterioration of the civil service and
political ethics to the extent it became apparent phenomenon.
Hence, it is most likely that the expected increase of oil revenues would lead to a wide and deep change
in the power position and influence of the political, economic, and social driving forces, especially the
ruling parties and the civil society’s organizations. Indeed, such changes have already appeared in KFR
as a result of the increase of the region government’s oil revenues and spending.
The perception is that the following main developments would arise as a result of the new oil
agreements: 
1. More dominance of the ruling authority.
2. Growing role of the private sector, especially in construction (contractors) and related
industries, small and medium industries, and few corporation companies. However, profit and
income taxes remain insignificant.
3. Receding importance of the public sector in manufacturing industries, agriculture, and services
enterprises, but it shall retain significant role in financing and running the strategic infrastructure
projects.
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4. Increasing influence of the financiers, the industrialists, the traders, the rich farmers, and the
professionals in the financial services sector.
5. Increasing role of the banks, the financial market, the insurance companies, and the financial
services.
6. Increasing importance of the middle class in the political, economic, culture, and scientific
activities.
7. Rising role of the private entrepreneurship, technology, and the management efficiency of the
companies and enterprises.
8. The importance of social security and welfare system would be increased to maintain the
benefits of the unemployed, elderly, pensioners, and poor people.
Remarkably, the dynamics and the outcome crisis of the "anticipated exorbitant" government spending
of the "excessive" oil revenues in the oil-rentier economies have similarity with the widening divergence
of the unlimited banks credits flow in the financial system and the flow of products and commodities in
the production system in the developed economies that caused the recent global financial crisis.[44]
Conclusions
Oil has been, and will continue to be, a major driving force in shaping the political economy of Iraq. The
“targeted” excessive and fast increase of oil revenues from the new oil agreements would either open
the space for the regime to establish a new system that maintain individual and public liberties,
liberalizing the economy and domestic politics from the high dependence on them, providing the basic
services and material needs to the citizens, or the other possibility; deepening the prevailing overall
crisis that is tied with the “silky ribbon” restrictions of "exorbitant" increase of consumption financed
mainly by the “excessive” oil revenues.
Iraq must, therefore, seize immediately this new strategic development by taking the following policies
and measures; 
1. Pursuing the process of economic liberalization gradually in parallel with the performance
made in increasing the share of non-oil industrial and economic activities to GDP, public
revenues, and exports.
2. Politically, the ruling parties and the civil communities must embark on a nation-wide public
debate on the objectives of the "national future vision" and to give rise to a strong, visionary,
unified, and popular liberal leadership. The weakness and indecisiveness of the coalition
governments’ experience should be concluded.
3. Institutionally, the government should initiate radical changes in the functions, the organization,
and the interrelationships of the State’s economic, financial, and monetary departments and
institutions, as well as its social development agencies. The need is apparent for the Ministry of
Finance and the Central Bank of Iraq. Also, the "Iraqi Council for Reconstruction and
Development" should be established as an independent entity in order to assume the tasks of
identifying and implementing a comprehensive program for the construction of the infrastructure
priority projects, and coordinate the efforts of the KFG and other Governorates. The tasks of the
Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation should be redefined to assume the
responsibility of designing "Iraq's future vision", the "long-term economic strategy", the "sectoral
development strategies", the "economic reform program", and advice on the "macroeconomic
policies". Also, a highly qualified unit should be established and attached to the Prime Minister
Office in order to implement the "privatization program" that should include a comprehensive re-
evaluation and rehabilitation of the public enterprises.
4. Most important, all  these political and institutional and technical requirements should be
coupled with a binding State’s Law in which 40% of total oil  revenues in the years 2011-2015,
and at least 70% in 2016 and onward, must be annually allocated to finance public investments
in building and modernizing the country’s physical, social, and environmental projects.
If the coming governments continue to be without economic direction and fail in utilizing the “targeted”
additional oil power for performing the required economic tasks in due time, the risk of enveloping Iraq’s
bright future for a long time is real.
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